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INTRODUCTION
There is an old adage from the 19th century that best describes
power: “Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely.”1 As of
January 2018, Google ranks among the top worldwide internet companies,
with a market capitalization of 782 billion U.S. dollars.2 With a market
share of 75%, Google has undisputed dominance as a search engine
company.3 Google is just one of the major tech companies that have
achieved unprecedented levels of success and wealth, joining the likes of
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft.
These companies are all hailed for their innovation and
progressive ideals, seemingly ushering in an age of friendly, people-loving
multinational corporations. The “tech giants” are something different than
1 This quote is attributed to John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, the historian and
moralist. The Phrase Finder, https://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/absolute-power-corruptsabsolutely.html, (January 14, 2018).
2 YAHOO FINANCE (January 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/GOOG/.
3 Market Share Statistics for Internet Technologies, NET MARKETSHARE (January 2018),
netmarketshare.com.
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anything that has come before: reflecting the personalities of the quirky,
young geniuses that built them, these Silicon Valley tech giants are
altruistically giving it all to create a better, more connected world.
Whereas corporations of the nineteenth and twentieth century were
predatory, cold, and focused solely on profits, these new twenty-first
century giants only want to build a better tomorrow. That’s why Google’s
corporate slogan had for the longest time been “Don’t be evil.”4 Or why
Facebook wants to “bring the world closer together.”5
At least, that is the perception that they are trying to create. There
is a heavily concerted effort to portray themselves as nerdy kids working
for the betterment of humanity.6 In reality, the tech giants like Google and
Facebook employ some of the most ruthless, calculating strategies in the
business world.7 Google, for example, has made the majority of its revenue
from data mining and advertisements.8 One of the main reasons they are
so successful in selling advertisements, and one of their main sources of
criticisms, is that they gather people’s data and sell them for more targeted
advertising.9 Google has approached privacy hypocritically, fiercely
defending its own privacy while violating everyone else’s.10
One of the company’s biggest controversies came in 2010 when it
was discovered that Google had been collecting people’s Wi-Fi data
through its Street View cars.11 The company took information like
people’s passwords, emails, and other personal information.12 As Enderle,
principal analyst at technology consulting firm Enderle Group put it: “I
think they should change their slogan to 'evil are us.' It seems like every
time you turn around they are doing something that is at best questionable
and at worst anti-people.”13
In September 2017, the New America Foundation think-tank
scholar Barry Lynn was fired.14 He alleges the firing was because
Google—one of the think-tank’s largest donors—was unhappy with his
4 Paul Buchheit, Paul Buchheit on Gmail, AdSense and More, GOOGLE BLOGOSCOPED
(July 16, 2007), http://blogoscoped.com/archive/2007-07-16-n55.html.
5 Alex Heath, Facebook has a new mission statement: 'to bring the world closer together',
BUS. INSIDER (June 22, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/new-facebook-mission-statement2017-6.
6 Olivia Solon & Sabrina Siddiqui, Forget Wall Street – Silicon Valley is the new political
power in Washington, THE GUARDIAN (September 3, 2017), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2017/sep/03/silicon-valley-politics-lobbying-washington.
7 Id.
8 Cadie Thompson, Does 'Don't be evil' still apply to Google?, CNBC (August 19, 2014),
https://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/19/does-dont-be-evil-still-apply-to-google.html.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Solon & Siddiqui, supra note 6.
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research, which called for tech giants such as Google, Amazon, and
Facebook to be regulated as monopolies.15 His contention is not without
merit: leaked emails revealed that the foundation was concerned about
Lynn’s research potentially jeopardizing future funding.16 Moreover, Eric
Schmidt, the chairman of Alphabet, Google’s parent company, donated
$21 million to New America Foundation and even called it the “Eric
Schmidt Ideas Lab.”17
Amazon, like Google, is almost universally loved by its users,18
and also tries to maintain a façade of altruism. Amazon is also one of the
foremost powers of the twenty-first century, reaching a level of success
that has so permeated commerce that their presence can only be described
as ubiquitous. By some measures, Amazon captures nearly half of all
online shopping.19 Online retail is just one facet of the tech giant’s
business, with the company also producing television and films, lending
credit, publishing, marketing, engaging in delivery and logistics, and
manufacturing.20 With the recent acquisition of Whole Foods, Amazon
also looks to move into the grocery and food production business.21 With
all of these enterprises and a continuing practice of favoring aggressive
expansion over profit, shares trade at over 900 times earnings, which tops
Standard & Poor’s 500 index as the most expensive stock.22 Today, half
of all U.S. households have an Amazon Prime membership, and one in
every two dollars spent online by Americans goes to Amazon.23 Despite
the love from both consumers and investors, in recent years Amazon has
had its benign mask peeled back to reveal the hungry predator underneath.
Amazon greedily swallows up smaller competitors and uses aggressive
bully tactics in negotiations.24 Famously in 2014, in a negotiation with
Hachette Publishing, Amazon delisted the publisher’s books from its
website as a form of leverage.25 This is a practice, amongst other predatory
practices, that eliminates competition and has lead Amazon to consume
industry after industry.26
Id.
Id.
17 Id.
18 Kim Hart & Ina Fried, Exclusive poll: Facebook favorability plunges, AXIOS (March 26,
2018), https://www.axios.com/exclusive-poll-facebook-favorability-plunges-1522057235-b1fa31dbe646-4413-a273-95d3387da4f2.html.
19 Lina Kahn, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 712 (2017).
20 Id. at 713.
21 Heather Haddon, Amazon’s Grocery Sales Increased After It Devoured Whole Foods,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (January 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazons-grocery-salesgained-weight-after-it-devoured-whole-foods-1515934801.
22 Kahn, supra note 1919, at 713.
23 Olivia LaVecchia & Stacy Mitchell, Amazon's Stranglehold: How the Company's
Tightening Grip Is Stifling Competition, Eroding Jobs, and Threatening Communities, INST. FOR LOC.
SELF-RELIANCE 4 (Nov. 2016), http://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ILSR_AmazonReport_
final.pdf.
24 Kahn, supra note 19, at 715.
25 Id.
26 LaVecchia & Mitchell, supra note 23, at 6.
15
16
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These Silicon Valley companies have all acted contrary to their
perceived image, but the question is why? Why would these companies try
so hard to appear socially progressive? After all, most people already
expect large corporations to favor profits over customers. The answer is
that these carefully constructed images are shrewd and calculated
decisions made in response to the threat of antitrust enforcement. It was
eighteen years ago when the U.S. government neutered Microsoft for
violating antitrust law, and all of the fledgling tech companies, who would
grow to dominate the world market, watched closely and learned an
important lesson about the power of antitrust law.27 Eric Schmidt, then
CEO of the tech company Novell, witnessed the impact the lengthy case
had on Microsoft, and he took the lesson to heart.28 When Google hired
him in 2001, Schmidt was determined to avoid the same fate that befell
Microsoft.29 United States v. Microsoft showed the world the power of
antitrust and impressed upon the leaders of the young tech companies the
need to play the political game and toe the line of monopoly and oligopoly.
30
Today, the tech giants are larger and more powerful than any company
to come before, including Microsoft of the late 90’s.31 It is interesting,
then, that the modern tech giants have evaded government scrutiny and
continued to grow, seemingly unfettered.
The state of modern antitrust law, due to a shift in legal thinking
and practice in the last four decades and the valuable lessons learned after
Microsoft, has led to this current level of unprecedented dominance for the
tech titans of the twenty-first century. Google, which has had massive
control over the advertisement and search engine market, is only now
starting to receive antitrust scrutiny; that is, at least in Europe.32
Domestically, antitrust law has waned in both power and
prevalence, and the willingness of modern tech giants to play
Washington’s game has certainly helped avoid prosecution. Back in 1997,
before the antitrust suit, Microsoft spent just $2 million on lobbying to

Solon & Siddiqui, supra note 6.
Id.
29 Id.
30 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
31 Ryan McQueeney, You’ll Never Believe Amazon’s Share of the E-Commerce Market,
NASDAQ (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/youll-never-believe-amazons-share-of-thee-commerce-market-cm904080.
32 Mark Scott, Google Fined Record $2.7 Billion in E.U. Antitrust Ruling, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (June 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/technology/eu-google-fine.html. For the
past two decades, antitrust law has been thriving internationally, with the EU taking an especially
aggressive stance towards the world’s largest tech companies. Id.; see also Maurice Stucke,
Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551 (2012) (“The past twenty years witnessed more
countries with antitrust laws and the birth and growth of the international organization of
governmental competition authorities, the International Competition Network (ICN), with over 100
member countries.”).
27
28
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Washington.33 Today, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Apple, and Facebook
have spent a combined $49 million on DC lobbying, and many of Silicon
Valley executives go to and from senior governmental positions.34 Google
alone spent more on lobbying than any other company, spending $9.5
million in the first half of 2017, and $15 million the year before.35 Google
and the other tech companies consistently use libertarian rhetoric and
vehemently denounce anticompetitive practice, claiming that people can
easily click other websites.36 However, these actions conflict with
empirical data, which indicates that the tech giants’ practices result in real
consumer harm.37
Despite the evidence, Washington has been hesitant to pursue any
real action against Google. And they are not the only company to play the
political game and avoid government scrutiny. Besides the millions spent
in lobbying, Amazon and CEO Jeff Bezos have navigated the diluted
waters of U.S. antitrust law to become the foremost retail power and
undisputed king of internet commerce.38 As domestic antitrust law has
shifted from its stance of market-based structures and broad policy-driven
goals to a narrow, economic outcome-based viewpoint, the influence of
antitrust, and indeed our national attitude towards antitrust, has
significantly waned.39
For example, Amazon has structured its business to consistently
underprice its products, to the detriment of profits.40 Due to the shift in
legal ideology, underpricing is not viewed as anti-competitive and, in fact,
is seen by courts to be evidence of good competition.41 It seems that when
he planned the course for Amazon’s growth, Jeff Bezos did so with an eye
on contemporary antitrust laws.42 Amazon is almost universally loved by
consumers and investors and ignored by the government, and as mentioned
above, they have toiled steadily down the road to monopoly.43 And yet
there is real harm being done to the markets and to consumers that is now
coming to light. Amazon’s practices are gutting suppliers who refuse to
deal with the tech giant’s terms and fueling a sharp decline in smaller,
independent retail business, among other cognizable harms.44 On top of
these other harms is the elimination of over 149,000 jobs in retail, and
Solon & Siddiqui, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
36 Id.
37 See generally, The FTC Report on Google’s Business Practices, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (March 2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report/, for the FTC’s 160-page report on
Google’s practices resulting in consumer harm.
38 McQueeney, supra note 31.
39 Eleanor Fox, The Goals of Antitrust: Against Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157, 2158
(2013).
40 Kahn, supra note 19, at 713.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 LaVecchia & Mitchell, supra note 23, at 6.
33
34
35
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Amazon’s forcing of many of its workers to work in grueling conditions.45
While not all harms are repressible under antitrust laws, these harms are
necessary to show the massive impact that the company has and why it is
important to change the way antitrust is approached and applied.
The shifting influence of anti-trust laws in the United States has
waned over the last four decades. Where once antitrust was called the
“Magna Carta of free enterprise,” today the Court views antitrust as an
annoyance at best.46 Where presidential candidates used to debate
antitrust, now it is only mentioned in how antitrust enforcement should be
scaled back.47 Americans once deeply cared about antitrust enforcement
and viewed monopolies with fear and suspicion.48 However, according to
a 2004 Gallup poll, many young Americans are not only unconcerned with
monopolies but view large corporations with a sense of satisfaction.49 This
new attitude is linked to the federal government no longer enforcing
antitrust law the way it had historically and has now led to a sense of
apathy towards monopolies on the whole.50
In contrast to the declining influence of antitrust in America,
antitrust is flourishing internationally: the ICN continues to grow, and
even traditionally antitrust-skeptic countries like China, Russia, and India
now have competition laws.51 In Europe, eight out of ten European Union
(“EU”) citizens agreed with fundamental principles of antitrust law: that
small companies need protection from large companies and that
competition creates more choices and leads to more innovation.52 These
principles are the foundation of the Clayton Act; so why then are these
ideals prevalent in foreign antitrust regimes, yet diminished domestically
where the Act was originally passed? To understand the answer, it is
important to first trace the history of antitrust law.
In this note, I will argue that the current antitrust framework is
misguided and based on erroneous legal and economic theories originating
from the Chicago School.53 I will argue that the neoclassical approach is

Id. at 6–7.
Stucke, supra note 32, at 553.
47 Id. In the 2000 campaign, President George W. Bush criticized the Microsoft antitrust
case as potentially harming innovation. See id. at n.17. The president then promised to scale back
antitrust enforcement, a trend that marks a notable shift in Republican policy that started with Reagan’s
reforms. Id.
48 Id. at 553–54.
49 Linda Lyons, Youthful Optimism? Young Americans Happy with "Big Business",
GALLUP (Mar. 2, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/10816/Youtful-Optimism-Young-AmericansHappy-Big-Business.aspx.
50 Id.
51 Stucke, supra note 32, at 552
52 Id. at 609–10.
53 “The Chicago School” is the name given to the neoclassical legal scholars and economic
theorists based out of the University of Chicago in the middle of the twentieth century. Kerry
45
46
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not only wrong when examining the legislative intent of Congress but is
also in contravention with the policy goals and foundational principles of
antitrust law. Furthermore, I will argue that the Chicago School’s narrow,
outcome-based view of antitrust is ill-equipped to deal with the demands
of the twenty-first century and especially with the online marketplace. The
tech giants are unprecedented in their scale, and the online markets that
they dominate are still in their infancy. The internet was not contemplated
when antitrust laws were drafted and certainly not during the time of the
Chicago School. That is why it is so critical to examine the original intent
of the Sherman Act and its progeny, in order to accurately respond to the
titanic power of these companies.
In Part II of this note, I will detail the history of antitrust law and
how it shifted from a broad, policy-based law to its current narrow,
economic framework. I will detail the policy and reasoning behind the
antitrust laws and how the old American fear of concentrated power led to
its inception. Part III will examine the most prominent tech giants that are
currently acting as an oligopoly, and how they are exactly the kind of
companies that the antitrust laws were meant to be applied to in the first
place.

I.

THE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST LAW
A. Development of Antitrust Law

Antitrust law began with the passing of the Sherman Antitrust Act
(the “Act”) of 1890.54 The Act was born out of growing concern for the
power of new, large business organizations called “trusts.”55 Congress
intended to reign in the power of these trusts but left the Act’s language
vague and very broad.56 This was done to allow the courts to develop the
field of antitrust law.57 The principle behind the Act was to stop the
concentration of economic power, which many lawmakers thought could
challenge democracy.58 The Act sought to distribute power and provide
“diversity and access to markets.”59
The main aspects of the Act are embodied in Sections 1 and 2.60
Section 1 of the Act “prohibits anticompetitive practices that are used to
Gutknecht, Apple and Amazon’s Antitrust Antics: Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Right, But Maybe They
Should, 22 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 160, 163 n.20 (2014).
54 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 165; see also The Sherman Antitrust Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1890).
55 Fox, supra note 39, at 2157.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Kahn, supra note 19, at 740.
59 Fox, supra note 39, at 2158.
60 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 166.
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build and maintain market power.”61 Section 1 goes on to make illegal
“every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . .”62 Section 2 prohibits
the formation of monopolies, and makes illegal activities that monopolize
trade.63
Unfortunately, problems with the Act became immediately
apparent, as there was little guidance or definition in the Act’s legislative
history or in the bill’s language.64 Once the new antitrust law reached the
United States Supreme Court for the first time, there was already
divisiveness in both the goals and the meaning of the law.65 The justices
were largely divided on how aggressive or conservative to be when
wielding antitrust law, as would be the case throughout the next century.66
However, for a law that was left open for judicial interpretation, Supreme
Court interpretation faced a slow start.67 It was not until two decades after
the law’s initial passing that the first major case reached the Court in
Standard Oil v. United States.68
The Standard Oil Court attempted to define the breadth and scope
of antitrust law, and the best approach to its application.69 This case saw
the birth of the “rule of reason,” which would be used to guide the analysis
of antitrust for many decades.70 The rule of reason was created for courts
“to leave it to be determined by the light of reason, guided by the principles
of law and the duty to apply and enforce the public policy embodied in the
statute, in every given case whether any particular act or contract was
within the contemplation of the statute.”71 In other words, this rule put the
general public welfare at the center with a broad view of the market as a
whole, rather than focusing on individuals.72
Alongside the “rule of reason,” the antitrust jurisprudence
developed rules centered on the recognition that some business practices
were so anticompetitive that no significant analysis was needed, and
certain per se rules were created.73 The first per se rule came before
Standard Oil, in the landmark antitrust case United States v. TransMissouri Freight Association.74 There, the Court held that collusive
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1.
63 15 U.S.C. § 2.
64 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 167.
65 Fox, supra note 39, at 2157.
66 Id.
67 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 167.
68 Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
69 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 168.
70 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 66.
71 Id. at 64.
72 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 168.
73 Id. at 169.
74 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1; United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
61
62
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pricing is always harmful and forbidden regardless of the intent of the
parties in the agreement.75 Since Trans-Missouri, the list of per se rules
grew over the next several decades to include market divisions, group
boycotts, and cartelization.76 These rules helped to flesh out the specifics
of the Act and develop antitrust law for the next several decades.77
The per se rules and the “rule of reason” should be understood as
two different standards under which the Supreme Court evaluates potential
antitrust violations.78 The per se rules are “black-letter prohibitions on
specific types of business arrangements.”79 Since these arrangements are
purely anticompetitive, the government must show that the arrangement
in question “lacks any redeeming virtue.”80 When a particular restraint on
trade falls within per se category, it is deemed unreasonable and thus
illegal as a matter of law.81 On the other hand, the “rule of reason” is more
like a balancing approach, with courts considering the trade restraint and
“its context, purpose, and effect.”82 Courts must take into consideration
“the nature of the industry, the reasons that the restraint was imposed, and
whether or not it has the desired consequences.”83 Both rules were
implemented on a case-by-case basis, and both were debated.84
Following Trans-Missouri and Standard Oil, Congress enacted a
series of laws to bolster the Act.85 The Clayton Act of 1914 would
strengthen the Act by covering for scenarios that the Act did not.86
Moreover, the Clayton Act provided for procedural and enforcement
scenarios, as well as helped define common antitrust terms with
specificity.87 The majority opinion in Standard Oil had drawn much
criticism due to its adoption of the “rule of reason,” as the holding of the
case gave too much discretion to the courts.88 The Clayton Act saw a
departure from the overbroad language of the Act, by providing much
more specific instances of unlawful acts.89 The specific provisions deal
with price discrimination, like predatory pricing practices,90 and governs
the mergers and acquisitions process.91 Alongside the Clayton Act, the
Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 342.
Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 170.
77 Stucke, supra note 32, at 553–55.
78 Jared Killeen, Throwing the E-Book at Publishers: What the Apple Case Tells Us About
Antitrust Law, 22 J.L. & POL'Y 341, 354–55 (2013).
79 Id. (emphasis added).
80 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).
81 Killeen, supra note 78, at 355.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Kahn, supra note 19, at 723.
86 Id.
87 3-18 Federal Antitrust Law § 18.1 (2017).
88 Id.
89 3-18 Federal Antitrust Law § 18.2 (2017).
90 Kahn, supra note 19, at 723.
91 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 165. For more of the specific provisions, see Clayton
Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
75
76
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Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), passed in the same session as
the Clayton Act, was designed to provide a dedicated commission that
would enforce the more specific laws of the new legislation and would be
more effective in combating the powerful trusts.92
The next several decades saw an increase in antitrust enforcement
and a broadening of antitrust powers with the passage of the RobinsonPatman Act of 1936 and the amendment to the Clayton Act in 1950.93 Up
until the 1960’s, the rules and goals of antitrust were largely agreed upon.94
The rule of reason was the accepted approach, and per se rules continued
to grow.95 They would reach their height in 1967 in United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co. where the Supreme Court applied per se rules to
nonprice vertical restrictions imposed on distributors by their supplier.96
However, at this time a movement in the economic world was
beginning to pick up steam, and the Chicago School began writing about
antitrust law and its goals.97 Led by the influence of powerful advocates
like Robert Bork and Richard Posner, the Chicago School derailed the
well-established antitrust jurisprudence and greatly narrowed the scope of
antitrust law.98 The Chicago School approach was, in essence, a price
theory view.99 Consumer welfare is the central focus of this approach, and
the goals of antitrust shifted to focus on outcomes, rather than enforcing
the policy behind the Act’s passing.100 According to the Chicago School,
the biggest indicator of consumer welfare is market efficiency.101 Market
efficiency should not be confused with competition. Further, “competition
can sometimes be inefficient. This is because while efficiency is an end in
itself, competition is just one possible means of achieving it.”102 The
Chicago School approach, therefore, suggests that restraints on trade may
be legal if they are efficient, as this would indicate that consumer welfare
has not been harmed.103 Thus, a business arrangement that would be illegal
92
93

3-18 Federal Antitrust Law § 18.2 (2017).
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1059

(1979).
Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 173.
Id.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont'l T.
V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
97 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 173.
98 Kahn, supra note 19, at 718–19.
99 Id. at 719.
100 Id. at 744. The Chicago School thought that courts should focus on the outcomes like
whether or not a particular business arrangement between competitors caused prices to rise. Id. Thus,
consumer welfare is at the heart of the Chicago School theory. Killeen, supra note 78, at 367.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 368.
103 Id. at 368–70. The Chicago Approach is backward looking and circular in its reasoning.
Because the raised prices did not result in consumer harm, the businesses engaging in the restraint of
trade did not violate antitrust law. This logic is not only conclusory, but it ignores the non-economic
harms of antitrust.
94
95
96
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under the broader rule of reason and per se approaches could be found to
be legal under the Chicago School approach.104
The Chicago School approach gained prominence in the early
1970’s and has since dominated the antitrust world.105 The Chicago
School’s influence on antitrust law cannot be overstated. Supreme Court
justices, heads of federal agencies, prominent lawyers and politicians, and
even presidents have been influenced by the Chicago School.106 Under the
Reagan administration, the president mandated that the government
should stay out of the business world and shrink regulation.107 The Reagan
administration operated under the influence of the Chicago School and
began viewing business acts as presumptively valid.108 The result was that
business conduct was not anticompetitive unless it resulted in consumer
harm.109 Notable politicians like Ralph Nader and John Kenneth Galbraith
championed the approach that consumer welfare was the sole goal of
antitrust and that it was best achieved through market efficiency.110 This
huge shift means that conduct which would normally have violated
antitrust law could be legal as long as the result did not reduce consumer
welfare.111
From the early 1980s to the modern day, antitrust law operated
with maximizing consumer welfare as its guiding principle: conveniently
forgetting the ninety years of antitrust law that had come before.112 Not
only has the legislative view of antitrust shifted, but public attitude
towards antitrust has appreciably declined. When looking at presidential
speeches and party platforms for the mention of antitrust, this decline can
be seen.113 Since presidential candidates and parties have a tendency to
only campaign on issues they think are relevant, their platforms are solid
metrics for determining what issues interest and resonate with the
public.114 Since the Carter administration, many presidents have invoked
antitrust in high-profile speeches, and the last significant mention of
antitrust from either party was in 1984 when Walter Mondale admonished
the FTC for running “roughshod over the nation’s antitrust laws.”115 Since
then, neither party has made any significant mention of antitrust and no
president has had a major involvement with the antitrust cases.116 Because
politicians will typically speak about issues they think are relevant to the
Id. at 383–84.
Robert Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws were Passed to Protect
Consumers (Not Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L. J. 959 (1999).
106 Id.
107 Fox, supra note 39, at 2158.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Kahn, supra note 19, at 742.
111 Id.
112 Fox, supra note 39, at 2159.
113 Daniel Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1165–66 (2008).
114 Id. at 1166.
115 Id. at 1169.
116 Id.
104
105
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American people’s interests, the fact that this decline has happened shows
that the public does not care about antitrust as they once did.117
B. Antitrust Policy
When the Act was passed by Congress in 1890, there were clear
policy goals and populist concerns attached to the antitrust law.118 But, the
modern concept of antitrust law birthed from the Chicago School is
erroneous: the Chicago School’s backward-looking approach is flawed in
its logic and ignores legislative history. More importantly, focusing on
consumer welfare to the exclusion of everything else, and using market
efficiency to do so, disregards the new and unique challenges presented by
the twenty-first-century market. The world has changed dramatically with
the internet, and the current framework of antitrust law is not equipped to
deal with the change.
The framework before the Chicago School’s intervention would
be better able to handle the current market due to its broader approach and
to the fact that antitrust law used to be driven by clear policy and goals. In
order to understand antitrust law’s place in the modern world and to show
that the Chicago School was clearly wrong in its approach, it is helpful to
examine the policy and goals behind antitrust law.
At the heart of antitrust law are the democratic sensibilities that
shaped this country.119 Ultimately, it was the fear and mistrust of
concentrated power in the hands of the few that powered the ProgressiveEra bill.120 Moreover, Congress did not hold the Chicago School’s view
that the markets were self-correcting.121 Instead, the legislators believed
that unregulated corporations could amass so much power and have so
much control over the markets that it could potentially threaten
democracy.122
Antitrust law was the natural response to the fear of concentrated
economic power and was used as the means to distribute that power.123
When Congress passed the Act in 1890, Senator John Sherman, the bill’s
namesake, advocated for the new law as an economic “bill of rights.”124 In
a speech, Senator Sherman articulated the underlying rationale for the
antitrust law, and it’s no coincidence that it rings with the voices of the
liberty-laced rhetoric of the founding fathers. He states: “If we will not
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endure a king as a political power, we should not endure a king over the
production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessities of life.”125
From this speech, it is clear that Senator Sherman believed that the
American ideals of liberty and freedom from monarchy should extend to
the economic world.126 He saw just how powerful the trusts were
becoming in this era and knew the dangers that too much concentrated
power could pose to democracy. Senator Sherman equates these trusts to
“an emperor” and calls their leaders “autocrat[s] of trade.”127
The fear was that the economic concentration of power by a few
elites would destabilize democracy.128 When private individuals massed
extraordinary wealth they could use that wealth to “influence
government.”129 The senators believed that monopolies were an existential
threat to any republic, and thus laws with the authority of Congress and
the will of the people were required in order to divide these monopolies.130
These sentiments were echoed almost universally, as the Sherman Act
passed with nearly unanimous support.131
The American ideals of liberty and the suspicion of concentrated
power in the hands of a few gave life to the antitrust law, but so too did
the concerns for robust markets and healthy competition.132 These
concerns stem from the belief that healthy competition causes healthy
markets.133 This is because competition ensures that business will innovate
and will continually try to give the best price to consumers.134 An
efficiency standard like what the Chicago School advocated for does not
further these consumer goals, and the likely result of this purely economic
view of antitrust law “will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate
giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive
role in economic affairs.”135
The American preference for checks and balances aligns with
antitrust law legislative history, but the Chicago School approach ignores
this and a chief harm that antitrust law was created to defend. Congress
has “exhibited a clear concern” that too much centralized power
“dominated by a few corporate giants” could lead to “the overthrow of
democratic institutions and the installation of a totalitarian regime.”136
While it is uncertain that a massive concentration of economic power in a
21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
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few elites would lead to the downfall of our nation, it is telling that
democracies and free market systems have almost always gone hand in
hand, but totalitarian regimes have almost never followed those
systems.137 In fact, studying historical and contemporaneous democracies
has revealed there is “an underlying common basis for democracy and a
market economy, and common characteristics between democracy and a
deconcentrated economic system.”138
Because of the close connection between political goals associated
with antitrust law and America’s broader ideals, it is important to not
separate the two when implementing antitrust. As free markets and
individual liberty are so intrinsically tied to American democracy, the
contemporary method of focusing on economic consumer welfare does not
serve our national interests, and this method should be abandoned.
II. THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW SHOULD BE
APPLIED TO THE TECH GIANTS, AND FULFILL THE GOALS OF
ANTITRUST
A. The Narrow View Problem and How the Law Should be Applied
The current regime of antitrust law is narrowly focused and does
not account for all forms of anticompetitive harm, especially in the context
of the online market. The heart of the current approach is concentrating on
market efficiency through the lens of consumer welfare.139 Not only is this
view flawed when compared to the original goals of antitrust law, but this
view also forgets other critically important consumer interests like
customer service and product quality, variety, and innovation.140 Because
the current antitrust framework fails to account for these concerns, the
framework should be abandoned.
Abandoning the narrow market efficiency approach would
faithfully apply antitrust law to the tech giants, who have escaped scrutiny
due to their care to avoid implicating consumer welfare concerns. The tech
giants have gained massive unprecedented power because the market
efficiency approach has not been able to meet the unique internet
marketplace. Certainly, the drafters of the Act and the later scholars of the
Chicago School could not have possibly envisioned the online market
place, but the original Act intended to stop the concentration of market
power and the creation of monopolies and oligopolies.141 The current
Id. at 1055.
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framework betrays that intent and decades of jurisprudence.142 It ignores
our interests as consumers, as workers, as citizens, and as competing
entrepreneurs.143 It also falsely conflates the goal of antitrust law as an
outcome-focused calculation, rather than addressing the concern over the
distribution of power in the marketplace.144 Hence, the current framework
needs to be abandoned: the focus on welfare betrays the legislative history
of antitrust and fails in the face of the current market’s unique challenges.
Moreover, the current approach fails because it does not prevent
harm to competition.145 Since the current framework of antitrust law solely
focuses on price and outcomes, enforcement cannot begin until after the
harm has already occurred.146 Specifically, the current approach ignores
how and when a company acquires market power and only acts after a
company has become so dominate that the company already rendered the
market noncompetitive.147 This approach is self-defeating and makes little
sense: what is the point of protecting competition in the market once the
market is no longer competitive? Logically, it makes much more sense to
protect competition when the market is at risk of becoming
noncompetitive and is conducive to the legislative purpose behind antitrust
law.148
The Chicago School’s approach not only betrays legislative intent,
but also fails on its own terms. The current approach misapplies the law
because the approach conflates market power with market efficiency and
assumes only price and outcome can indicate competition.149 In fact,
growing evidence shows that the Chicago School approach has led to
higher prices, but not to any efficiency gains.150
Further, the current antitrust framework has allowed such a
concentration of power in a few massive companies which bars small
businesses and entrepreneurs from entering the marketplace and from
competing.151 There has been a 50% drop in small business ownership in
America since the Reagan administration castrated antitrust law by
implementing the Chicago School philosophy.152 Every administration
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146 Id. at 738.
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since 1981 has implemented the current antitrust framework and has “all
but suspended traditional enforcement of America’s antimonopoly laws
. . . .”153 As a result, “regulators have done almost nothing to stop the great
waves of mergers and acquisitions, with the result that control over most
major economic activities is now more consolidated than at any time since
the Gilded Age.”154
Clearly, the current antitrust framework allows for a highly
concentrated market structure. This harms consumer interests overall and
betrays the goal of antitrust law. Robust competition promotes consumer
interest in a way that market efficiency does not.155 An open market that
is free from domination by industry giants, who hoard power, best
promotes competition. This harms consumers and workers, and, as
expressed by Senator Sherman, threatens democracy.156 Because of the
current application of antitrust laws, a small minority can amass outsized
wealth and can influence government.157 The legislators also wanted to
avoid a state of affairs where “private discretion by a few in the economic
sphere controls the welfare of all.”158 With the unprecedented power of the
tech giants and their enormous spending in Washington, D.C., it certainly
seems that these companies are exactly to whom the original drafters of
the Act wanted antitrust law to apply.
Unfortunately, the current doctrine of antitrust law does not see
the tech giants as anticompetitive because they employ techniques such as
predatory pricing, which the current framework does not recognize as
harmful; in fact, the current framework presumes that a corporation’s
activities are benign unless they lead to higher prices.159 Moreover, courts
and agencies mistakenly believe that practices like large corporate mergers
actually promote efficiency, and these courts and agencies fear false
positives.160 The current antitrust landscape has led to a paradox where
“modern U.S. antitrust protects monopoly and oligopoly, suppresses
innovative challenges, and stifles efficiency.”161 Focusing on efficiency
has been illogical because it has not taken into account any post-merger
inefficiencies and has led to the creation of firms that are too big to fail.162
The best guardian of competition is a competitive process, and the
unbridled power of the tech giants effectively acts as a barrier to entry.163
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The courts should abandon the Chicago School approach, and no longer
ignore the tech giants.
B. Amazon
Easily the world’s largest online retailer, Amazon has
unchallenged power over online commerce.164 In fact, one study shows
that 44% of U.S. consumers use Amazon before any other product search
engine.165 Amazon also controls 46% of all online commerce in the United
States alone.166 Half of all U.S. household members are subscribed to
Amazon Prime, and Amazon sells more products than any other retailer,
on or offline.167 Indeed, the power and reach of Amazon is “something
new in the history of American business.”168
It is important to detail the extent of Amazon’s reach in order to
show that the online retailer is the exact kind of centralized threat that the
Act framers were concerned about. Not only is Amazon the largest online
retailer, but they are also involved in groceries, film and television,
pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing.169 Amazon further provides the
cloud-based infrastructure for most of the country, powering everything
from Netflix to the CIA.170 In five years, estimates show that more than
two-thirds of all online commerce will be captured by Amazon.171
Moreover, Amazon has spread into dozens of industries and captured
many businesses.172 When we do business online, we may not think we are
dealing with Amazon, but in actuality, we are buying from one of the many
companies that they have conquered.173 It owns other large e-commerce
brands like AbeBooks, Woot, and Shopbop.174 It owns Diapers.com and
the shoe retailer Zappos.175 It even owns Twitch, the number one video
game streaming website.176
Amazon also recently obtained an ocean shipping license,
allowing it to ship freight between China and the U.S.177 Amazon’s level
of dominance and power is more akin to a small country than a
corporation. It is due to the uniqueness of the online market place and the
critical failures of courts and agencies to understand the online market
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combined with the inadequacy of the modern Chicago School framework
of antitrust law that has let Amazon grow out of control.
The scale of its growth can best be seen by its control over book
sales. Amazon started as a simple retailer for used books, but in 2009 they
reportedly had achieved a “90% market share of e-book sales.”178 This
state of affairs led to a highly publicized dispute between Apple and
Amazon.179 That case, and the underlying facts, are a great example of the
tactics Amazon has used to achieve monarchical power.180 It also
showcases the failures of the current antitrust framework and the failures
of the Chicago School’s reasoning.
Amazon dominates the e-book industry through predatory
pricing.181 Predatory pricing is the practice of cutting prices so low that
competitors cannot effectively compete.182 This strategy is one that
Amazon has used consistently to achieve its power and success.183 The
important point to note about predatory pricing is that the Chicago School
expressly stated that predatory pricing could not lead to sustained
success.184 Robert Bork, the leading scholar of the Chicago School, wrote
that the concept of predatory pricing was unlikely even a real
phenomenon, because it was irrational and did not reflect the Chicago
School assumption that all businesses are profit-seeking, rational actors.185
This stance is empirically wrong. As part of its effort to achieve the 90%
market share of e-books, Amazon priced bestsellers at $9.99, “which was
substantially lower than the price for hardcover versions.”186 Amazon has
consistently taken losses over the past twenty years, putting growth over
profits and directly contradicting Bork.187 These predatory practices were
so effective that it forced Apple and the five largest publishers to work
together in order to compete.188 Amazon has lowered its prices to
predatory levels, invested heavily in expanding, and grown in scale at the
expense of profits—practices that directly undercut contemporary antitrust
thinking and practice.189 This has allowed them to avoid scrutiny, and
shows how inept the current antitrust framework is and how badly reform
is needed.
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Another anticompetitive practice Amazon has employed in its rise
to power is its expansion into multiple business lines.190 Amazon has
vertically integrated with many manufacturers and producers and has
reached the point where “Amazon’s rivals are also its customers.”191 For
example, retailers that compete with Amazon will use its delivery services
and competing media companies will often buy a space on Amazon’s
platform in order to show their contact.192 In the last year alone Amazon
doubled the number of warehouses it operates, purchased thousands of
truck trailers, leased cargo planes, and increased its worth to nearly twice
that of Walmart.193 One investor, Chamath Palihapitiya, the owner of the
Golden State Warriors, has called Amazon a potential “multi-trilliondollar monopoly hiding in plain sight.”194
Palihapitiya’s comment highlights an important point about
Amazon: its growing power is quiet and in the background.195 Much of its
unprecedented success comes from its use of new technology to mine data
about our buying and browsing, and from its using that data to selectively
raise its prices.196 But Amazon’s pricing practices are not the only
monopolistic activities it engages in:
Amazon increasingly controls what products make it to market
and appear before us as we’re browsing. It has the power to pick
winners and losers, which is alarming enough in the context of
toys or fashion, but downright tyrannical when it comes to the
creative, cultural, and political life of the nation.197

This type of behavior is exactly what the original goal of antitrust law was
designed to stop.
Amazon’s activities in the e-book realm shows the company’s
predatory practices towards its peers, including the tech giant’s incident
with the e-commerce company Quidsi, the firm behind Diapers.com.198 In
2009, Amazon offered to buy Quisi, a company that had emerged as a top
competitor in diaper sales.199 When the founders refused, Amazon slashed
all prices of diapers on its platform.200 Amazon cut the prices by 30%–a
result of Amazon’s online algorithms tracking other companies’ prices and
then adjusting their own prices.201 Amazon would immediately slash its
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prices in response to any Quidsi changes.202 Amazon slashed its prices so
much in order to outperform Quidsi that Amazon was “prepared to lose
$100 million over three months.”203 Amazon’s tactics worked and stifled
Quidsi’s growth.204 Eventually, Amazon aggressively relaunched its bid to
buy Quidsi, who capitulated “largely out of fear.”205 Thus Amazon
swallowed one of its chief competitors in online retail, and the FTC let it
happen without a peep about antitrust concerns.206
The important point is that a year after buying out Quidsi, Amazon
raised its prices and cut back the Amazon Mom program, which had been
used to offer generous discounts while Quidsi was still Amazon’s rival.207
The prices hiked over the course of the next three years, leading to
customers expressing their frustrations online and threatening to take their
business to Diapers.com.208 Unfortunately, the Quidsi takeover meant that
Diapers.com was essentially Amazon.209
This incident highlights the failures of the Chicago School and
Robert Bork’s thinking. It runs contrary to the contemporary notion that
predatory pricing is not a path to buying up a competitor.210 The Chicago
School’s view can hardly be blamed. It is entirely logical to assume that
underpricing and intentionally losing profit would not lead to any kind of
monopolistic success. However, that just shows how unprepared the
current antitrust framework is to deal with the online tech giants.
Amazon is violating antitrust by their integration and expansion
into other businesses, and by their pricing tactics.211 But Amazon is also
providing a massive barrier to entry and stifling competition.212 This is
because investment in online platforms is not constrained by physical
barriers.213 Courts have failed to recognize this distinction, and failed to
recognize the psychological intimidation that the tech giants like Amazon
employ in order to block startups from intruding on their business.214
Furthermore, Amazon used its massive power to leverage itself
into other businesses. The tech giant negotiated lower prices with UPS
because it makes up a massive portion of the shipping company’s business
and, moreover, Amazon expanded its empire into physical infrastructure
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by building warehouses in excess of $13 billion.215 Amazon vertically
integrated its online platform into delivery at an astonishing rate, and
proved to be a great barrier to entry into the market.216 The problem with
the current framework is that it does not account for these barriers to entry
and its harmful effect on competition.217 This is because under the current
model, antitrust scrutiny only applies if Amazon used its dominance to
hike the prices, focusing solely on the harm to the consumer and ignoring
the harm to the competitor.218
Last year, Amazon expanded into a field completely unrelated to
retail and books. It acquired the grocery store Whole Foods.219 The reason
that this raises antitrust concerns is because it now gives Whole Foods
exclusive access among all grocery retailers to Amazon’s massive
platform.220 As Ramsi Woodcock argues, “[t]hat is bad for consumers
because it means that Whole Foods may come to dominate the grocery
world not by offering better products for the best prices, as you'd find in a
well-functioning market, but because of the promotional advantage that
comes from its tie-up with Amazon.”221 Under the current framework,
antitrust law focuses on consumer welfare through the outcome of
increased price. However, this is in contravention with the express purpose
of antitrust law.222 Amazon is causing much harm to competition, to
business owners, to manufacturers, and to workers, and this harm will pass
on to the consumer if antitrust law is not reformed and applied correctly.223
One avenue for reform that would allow the courts to apply
antitrust law against Amazon would be to include a presumption of
predatory pricing when it can be identified that a company is pricing well
below the average variable cost—a metric that most appellate courts agree
is calculable.224 It is inappropriate to use the current metric for predatory
pricing, the probability of a company recouping the losses of lowering
prices.225 This is because this analysis “diminish[es] the significance of the
215 Daniella Kucera, Why Amazon Is on a Building Spree, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29,
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price-below-cost element.”226 A good method advocated is to presume
predatory pricing of below-cost sellers when a company dominates a
market.227 Whatever constitutes domination should be left up to the courts
to develop, but there can be no doubt that Amazon dominates the market.
Moreover, a reform to antitrust law is appropriate in the case of
Amazon and other tech giants, and involves applying a stricter standard
for vertical integration. The current framework does not address how
companies can leverage their power in one sector to dominate another
sector. The courts should apply a stricter standard against corporations that
have reached a certain threshold of dominance.228 This is because the
current framework allows for a platform’s involvement in multiple related
and unrelated lines of businesses, which can create conflicts of interest and
lead to businesses favoring themselves over competitors.229 A prophylactic
approach that prevents these harms would be much more effective in the
case of Amazon than policing them after the fact. In Amazon’s case, a
preemptive and broader approach would stop the company from
dominating as a retailer and then entering into a market and competing
directly with companies that depend on its services for their business.230
Finally, replacing the current price and consumer welfare
approach with a broader rule-of-reason analysis is another possible venue
to applying antitrust to Amazon. This involves analyzing the
procompetitive effects of Amazon’s conduct and balancing them with its
anticompetitive effects.231 Amazon is clearly causing anticompetitive
effects.232 Increasing industry concentration in the tech giants such as
Amazon is a danger to our markets and is a harm that Congress intended
to prevent.
C. Google
Google has an unprecedented amount of control and influence. A
recent study shows that Google and Facebook combined have captured
83% of all ad revenue, and 73% of U.S. digital advertising.233 Google
dominates ad space and digital markets and has recently been the target of
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antitrust actions in the EU.234 Officials at the FTC investigated Google in
2011 and concluded that the tech giant used anticompetitive tactics and
“abused its monopoly power” in ways that harmed internet users and
rivals, and favored its own business.235 In the EU alone, Google has
captured 90% of the online search market.236 As the European competition
chief Margarethe Vestager said, “Google’s magnificent innovations don’t
give it the right to deny competitors the chance to innovate.”237
On top of the uncontested dominance of the search engine market
share, Google owns the Android operating system which holds an 81%
market share of all operating systems.238 The EU’s antitrust chief alleges
that Google uses its ownership of Android to “pre-install[] . . . apps and
services onto Android smartphones” to give itself preferential treatment
over its rivals.239 Google counter-argued that its software is open to all;
however, the pre-installation of Google apps and services, like Google
Chrome, excludes other rival search engines and has “made it difficult, if
not impossible, for rival search engines and smartphone app stores” to
compete with Google.240 Google has abused its dominance to harm
cellphone manufacturers who are increasingly reliant on the Tech Giant
and have been bound by Google’s contracts.241
Google requires cellphone manufacturers to preinstall the
company’s services, and had given the manufacturers financial incentives
to favor Google’s services over its competitors.242 Moreover, Google has
used its dominance over the internet by diverting traffic from its
competitors towards its own site.243
However, one of the biggest concerns that the tech giants like
Google implicates involves data. The control over data is a new field of
commerce that has advertisers buying and selling personal information in
order to better sell products.244 This new field may also enable new forms
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of anticompetitive activity that lawmakers have not contemplated.245 The
control over data allows Google to instill such dominance that it acts as an
impenetrable barrier to entry, and stifles competition.246 Finally, control
over data unfairly harms competition because it allows for leveraging: that
is, Google can use all the data about its user on one platform, such as Gmail
or Google Chrome, and then use it to benefit another one of its businesses
in a different market (YouTube, for example).247
Google allocates data gained from one business to advance the
interests of its other businesses. For example, Google can use data gained
from its other businesses like Gmail or YouTube to refine searches and
highlight certain ads or products higher on a search and bury other
products lower on the search.248 Moreover, the existence of data driven
businesses like Google implicates other non-price competition concerns,
such as privacy protection offered to consumers.249 The privacy concern is
increasingly important to consumers when they decide which email to use,
which search engine to use, and which browser to use.250
Because privacy and personal data is an important choice for
consumers, agencies and courts should closely examine activity and
mergers of tech companies like Google and determine if these companies’
activities would likely reduce incentives to compete and to offer better
privacy guarantees to the consumer.251 Therefore, a viable antitrust theory
that could be applied to Google’s unmatched control over personal data is
that the loss of privacy is similar to a reduction in the quality of a product
or service.252 The FTC’s investigation of a Google merger echoes this
sentiment, suggesting that consumer privacy is one of the “non-price
attributes of competition.”253 Unfortunately, privacy is a hard-to-quantify
harm, yet that does not mean that the law should disregard it as a concern.
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A different antitrust framework is required for Google, because it
is unique in American business, and the current framework was not created
to comprehend the competitive harms that the tech giants have wrought.
As Allen P. Grunes and Maurice E. Stuck argue, the tech giants are not
just data driven companies, “they are media companies.”254 As
“advertising-supported media, they, like much of the traditional media, are
free to the user.”255 Advertisers subsidize the costs associated with the
online service companies, “and advertising dollars account for most of the
revenues.”256 However, online service companies differ from traditional
media in that they collect massive amounts of user data in real time and
have a direct contract with the user.257 Moreover, these companies have
been able to convince some of the lower courts that, because their services
are free, there is no market that can be harmed, which is clearly erroneous.
Google serves as a massive barrier to entry. The court in United
States v. Bazaarvoice explicitly recognized that data can serve as an entry
barrier.258 The hoarding of data is incentivized economically by the fact
that online companies make money by using data to sell targeted ads.259 If
data is not hoarded, then the money slows down. Therefore, it is not
realistic to assume that the giant online service companies will willingly
slow their data gathering to provide better privacy for consumers. It is also
very difficult, because of Google’s dominance, for other companies to
enter the market and provide better privacy for consumers.260 There have
been alternative online services like DuckDuckGo, but these companies
have searches in the low millions compared to Google’s 5 billion searches
daily.261
Treating online companies like Google the same as traditional
media companies or focusing solely on one side of the market is a mistake
and does not effectively address the harm to competition. Other potential
avenues for enforcers and courts to apply antitrust law to Google and
online service companies is to recognize data-driven exclusionary
conduct. As noted above, data-driven companies like Google will often try
to prevent rivals and smaller startups from accessing the data needed to
grow, in order to maintain a competitive advantage.262
Courts and agencies should look to “how the control of personal
information contributes market power in the digital economy and the
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implications for data protection” and “the risks to the consumers posed by
concentrations and the abuse of market dominance where firms possess
massive amounts of personal data,” among other concerns, when
analyzing the activities of Google and other online service platforms.263
The FTC’s investigation of Google in 2012 revealed that the company had
been engaged in data-exclusionary practices such as entering into
exclusionary agreements with websites for better search positions and
search advertising services.264 In an FTC memo, the Commission
explicitly wrote that “Google has monopoly power in one or more properly
defined markets.”265 Their recognition of Google’s monopoly and their
failure to pursue an action suggests that the current antitrust framework is
flawed and is not prepared to meet the challenge of the online tech
companies. If the current Chicago School framework is abandoned and a
framework that utilizes the suggested methods for enforcing antitrust law
is used instead, then antitrust law would be back to serving the policy goals
that the original drafters of the Sherman Act envisioned.266
D. Facebook
The online tech companies pose unique threats to competition that
the Chicago School framework is not prepared to handle. As discussed
previously in Section II.C, there is a new, emerging market in the form of
buying and selling personal data in the advertising space.267 Google is not
the only company that implicates antitrust problems with data.268
Facebook also has an antitrust problem, and similar to Google, Facebook
is receiving strict scrutiny in Europe but almost none at home.269
Regulators in Germany ordered Facebook to stop collecting and storing
data about German users.270 The German competition authority further
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opened an investigation to determine if Facebook had misused its
dominant position to collect people’s information.271
One especially apparent antitrust problem for Facebook is that it
refuses to let any company compete with it. Facebook is afraid of going
the way of MySpace and becoming extinct due to a new, innovative start
up supplanting it.272 Facebook is the dominant social media platform today
with over 1.7 billion users monthly.273 Mark Zuckerberg, the creator and
CEO of Facebook, noticed two companies that were growing so rapidly
that they threatened Facebook’s complete dominance of social media.274
The two companies were Instagram and WhatsApp, and “both were
amassing users at an amazing rate.”275 Instead of innovating and trying to
outcompete the two companies, Facebook bought Instagram for $1
Billion, and WhatsApp for $21.8 billion.276
This is “par for the course in Silicon Valley” and is one of the
many reasons that the tech giants have become so overwhelmingly
dominant.277 The United States and Europe both examined the Facebook
and WhatsApp merger and cleared it, deciding the deal did not pose
antitrust concerns.278 However, they reasoned that the messenger service
was an alternative form of competition.279 This reasoning ignores the fact
that dominance for a social media company is about users and views, as
that directly correlates to advertiser dollars.280 The current antitrust
framework does not work, and as one commentator noted, “[t]he antitrust
system results in the increasing oligopoly that we have, where a few
companies dominate major industries, accruing the wealth and power that
go with it as potential disrupters are swallowed at birth, the way Cronus,
the titan in Greek mythology, ate his young to prevent their uprising.”281
Alongside data hoarding and the swallowing up of smaller
startups, Facebook poses another unique concern to our markets and our
democracy. This is a phenomenon that has emerged in recent years and
has dominated the public conscious. This problem is, of course, fake news,
which is also an antitrust problem.282
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As written above, tech giants like Google and Facebook double as
media companies. When viewed this way, Facebook is competing with
news publishers. “They compete for users’ time spent online, user data and
advertising dollars.”283 Facebook has effectively lessened the number of
users that visit traditional news sites and directs the users to get their news
from Facebook, which has helped the decline of legitimate news and
helped facilitate the rise of fake news.284 Legitimate news sites have
overhead costs that fake news sites do not, and by giving a large platform
to these fake news sites, they are indirectly helping the spread of fake news
and destroying potential competitors in the process.285 “Facebook is a
juggernaut in news distribution, big data and online advertising.”286 In fact,
66% of the 1.7 billion monthly users get their news from the platform,
according to Pew Research.287 That adds up to 44% of U.S. adults who get
their news from Facebook.288
Facebook uses certain methods to keep users on its site and to
divert its users away from news sites.289 For example, Facebook hosts the
content of legitimate news sites, but because it defaults to in-app browsing
or embedded images, people can get the content from the news sites but
give Facebook all the clicks.290 This is an antitrust problem for a variety of
reasons—chief among them is the fact that Facebook is leveraging its
market dominance to capture all the traffic that should be going to its
competitors who actually produce the content, while fake news publishers
are given a platform on Facebook that also lessens the traffic to its
competitors.291
There can be no doubt that legitimate news is under attack from
the tech giants like Google and Facebook.292 The duopoly holds 83% of
all digital ad revenue.293 Interestingly, this implicates one of the major
concerns behind antitrust policy: namely that centralization of power in
market actors harms our republic. Specifically, the spread of fake news
and the increasing reliance of the American people on the tech giants for
their information leads to the decline of legitimate information, which is
the basis for any politically aware citizen’s choices.
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Antitrust law can be applied to Facebook as outlined by the
European Commission’s investigation into the Facebook/WhatsApp
merger. There, the EU outlined a roadmap for antitrust enforcement.294
Enforcers should check to see if the Tech Giant controls any “essential
parts” of the network.295 They should check whether users of consumer
communications applications are locked-in to any physical network, and
check whether the company controls and limits the “portability of data.”296
Finally, enforcers should check if parties’ applications are pre-installed on
a large base of mobile phones, tablets, or computers, and if “status quo
bias” may affect consumers’ choice.297
Ultimately, using this roadmap to determine if Facebook or other
tech giants are engaging in anticompetitive activity would help agencies
and courts by giving them specific, cognizable factors to consider. The
current narrow framework of antitrust law could be applied to Facebook
through these factors, but an overall change in the antitrust approach
should be taken in order to meet the challenges posed by the tech giants.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust law is not in a good place. The framework and analysis
has shifted based on the theories of a few scholars in the Chicago School.
Their undue influence resulted in a warping of antitrust law. No longer
does antitrust law follow the goals of the original drafters of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts. What once was a law designed to act as a safeguard
against centralized mercantilism from encroaching on our democracy has
become a much narrower and much weaker field of law. Senator Sherman
and his Congress saw the threat that centralized economic power posed to
America’s freedom. It is a shame that the current lawmakers and agencies
seem to be blind, or purposefully ignorant, to the dangers posed by the
massive tech giants and, in general, the dominant multinational
corporations that have largely escaped scrutiny.
The history of antitrust law and the legislative intent of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts make it clear that antitrust law was supposed
to be applied much more broadly and to companies who are as dominant
and centralized as the tech giants. Amazon may be the most powerful
private economic actor to ever exist; it is certainly unique in the history of
American business. Amazon’s dominance has led to unprecedented
growth and to the stifling of any and all competitors, which has further led
to lower wages and higher prices. The direction that Amazon is headed
seems almost dystopian, but antitrust law as it should be applied would
definitely curb this threat and restore competition to the online market. By
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abandoning the current framework, recognizing predatory pricing as a
legitimate antitrust concern, reworking the framework of the vertical
integration analysis, and applying a much broader rule of reason approach,
antitrust law could be applied to Amazon.
Google is a data-hoarding monopoly that is shutting down anyone
with differing views and using highly aggressive tactics to bludgeon
dissenters into submission. Google’s tactics developed under the cutthroat
Eric Schmidt have sent a clear message to competitors and cooperators
alike: play ball, or else. The android software that comes pre-installed with
Google apps and the appropriation of personal data from one platform to
benefit other Google businesses to the detriment of its competitors is a
clear antitrust harm to competition. By abandoning the current Chicago
School framework which only recognizes consumer welfare through a
price-changing analysis and instead focusing on the company’s effects on
competition (which antitrust was originally designed to look at), antitrust
law would be effective in curbing many of Google’s anticompetitive
practices. Furthermore, the current framework and agencies do not show
a proper understanding of Google’s activities. They must look to datadriven exclusionary practices and the creation of massive barriers to entry.
Finally, antitrust law could help to stop the spread of fake news
and mass misinformation that is plaguing our nation, harms that are
directly implicated by the policy goal of antitrust to protect democracy. By
applying antitrust law to Facebook and treating Facebook as a media
company directly competing with legitimate news organizations, the
massive spread of misinformation can be stopped. Moreover, by applying
antitrust principles to stop Facebook from swallowing up competition, and
by breaking up Facebook’s ownership over other social media companies,
antitrust law would help facilitate stronger competition and ultimately help
consumers. Antitrust enforcers should look to users and clicks to
determine dominance in the social media market, as that directly correlates
to advertising money.
Antitrust law could be robust and healthy and further the original
goals that Senator Sherman and his colleagues intended. If the Chicago
School framework of consumer welfare is abandoned and instead antitrust
law focuses on the harm to competition, then antitrust law’s legislative
purpose would be satisfied. At the same time, this would stop the tech
giants from completely controlling the destiny of both online and offline
markets. Our nation’s exercise of democracy depends on a fully informed
populace who elect representatives without undue influence from an
oligopoly. There is too much at stake, and therefore antitrust law needs to
see a big change in the coming years.

